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ANTHONY MUSANTE*
Black and White:  What Law and
Literature Can Tell Us About the
Disparate Opinions in Griswold
v. Connecticut
The great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and
divide fields of black and white.1
[T]he heart of law is what we always knew it was:  the open
hearing in which one point of view, one construction of lan-
guage and reality, is tested against another.  The multiplicity of
readings that the law permits is not its weakness but its strength,
for it is this that makes room for different voices and gives a
purchase by which culture may be modified in response to the
demands of circumstance.  It is a method at once for recogniz-
ing others, for acknowledging ignorance, and for achieving cul-
tural change .2
Recent political battles have rekindled the ever-present andcontentious debate over the extent of privacy rights guar-
anteed by the Constitution.3  More than simply another example
of partisan bickering, this political strife typifies the divide that
* J.D. Candidate, University of Oregon School of Law, 2007.  Notes & Comments
Editor, Oregon Law Review , 2006-2007.  I would like to thank Daylyn Kelley for her
immeasurable patience and understanding.  Also, I am thankful for my parents,
Matthew and Lucy Musante, without whom my existence would surely be in doubt.
1 Springer v. Gov’t of the Phil. Is., 277 U.S. 189, 209 (1928) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
2 JAMES BOYD WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING:  CONSTITUTIONS
AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY 273 (1984).
3 See, e.g. , Timothy Egan & Adam Liptak, Fraught Issue, but Narrow Ruling in
Oregon Suicide Case , N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2006, at A16 (on assisted suicide); Ed-
ward Lazarus, Kennedy Center , NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 14, 2005, at 16 (chronicling the
most politicized areas of constitutional law, and hypothesizing how the Court’s rul-
ings will change with new Court members); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimal Appeal , NEW
REPUBLIC, Aug. 1, 2005, at 17 (describing the different theoretical factions on the
Court and how they would decide major national issues); Michael Kinsley, Abolish
Marriage:  Let’s Really Get the Government Out of Our Bedrooms , SLATE, July 2,
2003, http://www.slate.com/id/2085127 (on gay marriage);  Michael Kinsley, What
[853]
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separates those who view the Constitution as preserving explicit
rights and those compelled to infer from the text a more expan-
sive set of guarantees.  While the dispute is frequently argued
narrowly in terms related to the landmark 1973 decision Roe v.
Wade ,4 the fundamental underlying disagreement is about far
more.5  The national polarization is alternatively characterized as
liberal versus conservative, Republican versus Democratic, “Red
State” versus “Blue State,” or more generally as the “Culture
Wars.”  But it is noteworthy that many of the disputes that make
up these broader differences emanate from constitutional eluci-
dation, and ultimately come down to a question of the judiciary’s
role in reading and interpreting the Constitution.  Accusations of
judicial activism and the condemnation of “freewheeling” judges
highlight the national discussion now taking place about the
meaning of the Constitution and the judiciary’s role in interpret-
ing it.  In fact, this is the criticism most often reserved for Justice
Blackmun’s decision in the landmark case Roe v. Wade , where it
is thought by many that the judiciary effectively usurped the role
of the legislature.6
It is evident that this national polemic did not emerge solely
from the controversy over the moral implications associated with
the decision in Roe .  Rather, Roe  has acted as the adjudicative
lightning rod, or microcosmic moral battleground, for a larger
Abortion Debate?:  Why There Is No Honesty About Roe, SLATE, Nov. 18, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2130607 (abortion).
4 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5 The debate can be characterized as attempting to articulate where the judiciary
derives its authority and how it should interpret the Constitution. See, e.g. , discus-
sion infra  Conclusion.
6 See, e.g. , Jules B. Gerard, Roe v. Wade Is Constitutionally Unprincipled and
Logically Incoherent:  A Brief in Support of Judicial Restraint , 15 AM. J.L. & MED.
222 (1989) (vociferously critiquing the line of precedent used to decide Roe  and the
rationale of the decision’s holding); Arnold H. Loewy, Why Roe v. Wade Should Be
Overruled , 67 N.C. L. REV. 939, 940 (1989) (fearing the rise of a “judicial dictator-
ship”); William Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitutional Review from Gris-
wold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade:  An Outline of a Decision Merely Overruling
Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1681 (arguing that the Court in Roe  “substituted judicial
hubris for judicial deference” in placing its views before those of the state legisla-
tures).  But cf. Neal Devins, The Countermajoritarian Paradox , 93 MICH. L. REV.
1433, 1452 (arguing that many legislators preferred the “Roe-created ‘status quo’”)
(reviewing DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY:  THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY
AND THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994)); Note, The Evolution of the Right to
Privacy After Roe v. Wade, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 368, 378 (noting the post-Lochner
deference to social legislation and how Roe  apparently contradicts that tradition,
but ultimately finding that “[j]udicial action does not offend the separations of pow-
ers doctrine”).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-3\ORE305.txt unknown Seq: 3  9-APR-07 14:35
2006] Black and White 855
constitutional debate.  As such, the controversy over Roe  has ob-
scured the fundamental argument that continues to take place—
namely, is the Constitution a document to be interpreted by suc-
cessive generations, with a concomitant expansion or contraction
of rights?  Or, is what was written in the Constitution in 1787 the
absolute limit of the rights expressed therein?  This larger, more
fundamental judicial question is implicitly addressed in Griswold
v. Connecticut , the 1965 case that Justice Blackmun relied on in
formulating the majority opinion in Roe.7
This Comment attempts to elicit a more thorough understand-
ing of the Justices’ views of the Constitution and its guarantees of
privacy rights as articulated in Griswold .  Since its publication in
1965, Griswold v. Connecticut  has been a source of debate and
intellectual examination, with the resulting conclusions fre-
quently spawning as many questions as they attempt to answer.8
This Comment does not seek answers to academic or cultural
questions where others who are far more qualified have already
ventured.  Rather, by utilizing the techniques and tools proffered
by Law and Literature studies, this Comment broadly attempts
to glean more meaning from the Justices’ words than the casual
reader could hope to ascertain, and, perhaps concomitantly, shed
new light on the cultural debate currently taking place in
America.
According to Professor James Boyd White, “[T]he Supreme
Court has established itself as a central institution for the self-
conscious and authoritative reconstitution of our language, cul-
ture, and community.”9  It follows that, through examining the
reasoning and techniques employed by the Justices in Griswold ,
we will be better equipped to understand the way in which
American culture post-Griswold  was remade, and hopefully be
7 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
8 See, e.g. , Janet L. Dolgin, The Family in Transition:  From Griswold to Eisen-
stadt and Beyond , 82 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1536 (1994) (attempting to come to terms with
the “constitutional conundrums” faced post-Griswold  by attributing the Court’s rul-
ing to radical changes in the American family structure); David Helscher, Griswold
v. Connecticut and the Unenumerated Right of Privacy , 15 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 33, 34
(1994) (attempting to ascertain whether the right of privacy can be considered im-
plicit in human existence); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Sex, Lies and Jurisprudence:
Robert Bork, Griswold and the Philosophy of Original Understanding , 24 GA. L.
REV. 1045, 1046 (1990) (seeking to square Robert Bork’s theory of jurisprudence
with Griswold).
9 WHITE, supra  note 2, at 264; see also  discussion infra  Part II.A (addressing this R
issue in more depth).
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better able to articulate and participate in the debate that has
emanated from this renovation.  To assist in analyzing Griswold ,
as well as to define the scope of the analysis under Law and
Literature, this Comment first broadly summarizes the positions
of the most pertinent intellectuals in the Law and Literature
movement and provides a brief synopsis of the movement’s
history.
Part I of this Comment outlines the development of the Law
and Literature movement and articulates, through example, the
viability of various theories within the movement’s subsets of
law-in-literature and law-as-literature.  Part II of this Comment
describes various theories of judicial and constitutional interpre-
tation developed by the Law and Literature movement and criti-
ques how the movement’s theorists incorporate literature into
their reasoning.  Finally, Part III  applies the theories and reason-
ing articulated by Law and Literature theorists White, Richard
Weisberg, and Sanford Levinson to the judicial reasoning in Gris-
wold v. Connecticut .
I
THE LAW AND LITERATURE MOVEMENT
A. The Pre-History
The Law and Literature movement, like any multidisciplinary
school of thought, must be examined as a historical development
to be adequately understood.10  Foreshadowing the distinction
that subsequently arose within academia, the prehistory of Law
and Literature was marked by the development of two separate
submovements.11  Law and Literature has its birth in the law-in-
literature movement started in the mid-nineteenth century.12
The movement was marked initially by Dean John Wigmore’s ef-
10 See GARY MINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS:  LAW AND JURISPRU-
DENCE AT CENTURY’S END 150-51 (1995), and IAN WARD, LAW AND LITERATURE:
POSSIBILITIES AND PERSPECTIVES 3-27 (1995), for a modern history of the develop-
ment of the movement, including an account of the disparate, and often acrimoni-
ous, theorizing within it.
11 See, e.g. , Michael Pantazakos, Ad Humanitatem Pertinent:  A Personal Reflec-
tion on the History and Purpose of the Law and Literature Movement , 7 CARDOZO
STUD. L. & LITERATURE 31, 38-39 (1995) (noting the differences between law-in-
literature and law-as-literature, distinctions that marked the beginning of the Law
and Literature movement).
12 Id.  at 38.
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forts to chronicle the rise of literature about the law.13  Nearly
contemporaneously, what became known as law-as-literature de-
veloped when Benjamin Cardozo began utilizing literary tools to
examine and more effectively create judicial opinions.14  Thus,
the movement was born of two seemingly disparate theories; al-
though neither theory appeared to offer much in the way of a
cohesive approach to the law, both were intent on humanizing
the law.15
While the Law and Literature movement initially was com-
posed of these two separate strands of thought, many contempo-
rary scholars argue that this fundamental distinction no longer
exists.16  However, to better understand the potential of the Law
13 Id.
14 Id. ; see, e.g. , Benjamin Cardozo, Law and Literature , 48 YALE L.J. 489 (1939)
(originally published in the Yale Review , July 1925); Dan Simon, The Double-Con-
sciousness of Judging:  The Problematic Legacy of Cardozo , 79 OR. L. REV. 1033,
1045-46 (2000) (describing Cardozo’s work as a subjective, creative process that “en-
tails creation of law”).  In “Law and Literature,” Cardozo stated:
One marvels sometimes at the ingenuity with which texts the most remote
are made to serve the ends of argument or parable.  But clearness, though
the sovereign quality, is not the only one to be pursued, and even if it were,
may be gained through many avenues of approach.  The opinion will need
persuasive force, or the impressive virtue of sincerity and fire, or the mne-
monic power of alliteration and antithesis, or the terseness and tang of the
proverb and the maxim.  Neglect the help of these allies, and it may never
win its way.  With traps and obstacles and hazards confronting us on every
hand, only blindness or indifference will fail to turn in all humility, for gui-
dance or warning, to study of examples.
Cardozo, supra , at 492-93.
15 Pantazakos, supra  note 11, at 38 (noting that Wigmore’s attempts to chronicle R
the Great Books involving the law resulted from his desire to teach attorneys to deal
with the multitude of personality types that they were sure to encounter in their
practice).  Furthermore, by integrating literature into his opinion writing, Justice
Cardozo sought to make judicial pronouncements more accessible to common un-
derstanding.  For example, consider the following statement by Justice Cardozo:
Perhaps there are opinions by Mr. Justice Holmes in which [the magisterial
method] can be discerned.  The sluggard unable to keep pace with the
swiftness of his thought will say that he is hard to follow.  If that is so, it is
only for the reason that he is walking with a giant’s stride.  But giants, after
all, are not met at every turn, and for most of us, even if we are not pyg-
mies, the gait of ordinary men is the safer manner of advance.  We grope
and feel our way.  What we hand down in our judgments is an hypothesis.
It is no longer divine command.
Cardozo, supra note 14, at 496. R
16 See, e.g. , MINDA, supra  note 10, at 151 (suggesting that some Law and Litera- R
ture scholars, including Ronald Dworkin, Stanley Fish, and Owen Fiss, have “differ-
ent conceptions about law and adjudication,” rejecting the “‘law and literature’
dichotomy altogether in finding that legal and literary criticism are deeply unified in
method and temperament”); WARD, supra  note 10, at 3 (explaining that while the R
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and Literature movement and provide a convenient organiza-
tional tool, this Comment examines selected examples from the
preeminent theorists within each school, as well as an amalgama-
tion of law-in-literature and law-as-literature—James Boyd
White’s The Legal Imagination .
B. The Legal Imagination
James Boyd White’s 1973 publication of The Legal Imagina-
tion: Studies in the Nature of Legal Thought and Expression17
introduced the Law and Literature movement to a broader legal
community overrun by formalism.18  This textbook is widely re-
garded as the official beginning of Law and Literature as a legiti-
mately distinct field of jurisprudential scholarship.19  Professor
White, through this publication, sought to place Law and Litera-
ture squarely within the accepted mores of legal education by
designing the textbook to be used in the law school curriculum.20
delineation is convenient, it is not always feasible or desirable because of the compli-
mentary relationship that the two branches of thought share); Pantazakos, supra
note 11, at 40-41 (arguing that despite the multifaceted approach taken to Law and R
Literature, there exists a “greater unity above the seeming disorder”).
17 JAMES B. WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION:  STUDIES IN THE NATURE OF LE-
GAL THOUGHT AND EXPRESSION (1973).
18 See, e.g. , Anthony Julius, Introduction  to 2 LAW AND LITERATURE:  CURRENT
LEGAL ISSUES 1999, at xi (Michael Freeman & Andrew D.E. Lewis eds., 1999)
(characterizing White’s work as “retriev[ing] the study and practice of law from . . .
legal formalism”) [hereinafter 2 LAW AND LITERATURE]; Gary Minda, Cool Jazz but
Not So Hot Literary Text in Lawyerland:  James Boyd White’s Improvisations of Law
as Literature , 13 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 157, 159 (2001) (hypothesizing,
and convincingly showing, that White’s work was written in response to Posner’s
law-as-economics theory).
19 See, e.g. , Michael Freeman & Andrew Lewis, Preface to 2 LAW AND LITERA-
TURE, supra  note 18, at ix (characterizing James Boyd White as the “doyen” of the R
Law and Literature movement); MINDA, supra  note 10, at 149 (characterizing White R
as “establish[ing] the groundwork for the modern movement of law and literature”);
C.R.B. Dunlop, Literature Studies in Law Schools , 3 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERA-
TURE 63 (1991) (referring to the publication of White’s book as the starting point for
an extreme growth in Law and Literature course offerings at law schools); Julius,
supra  note 18, at xi (referring to White’s book as a catalyst for the Law and Litera- R
ture movement); Minda, supra note 18, at 157 (noting that White is “famous for the R
idea of ‘law as literature’”); Pantazakos, supra  note 11, at 39 (stating that White’s R
text constituted the “formal beginnings” of the movement); David Ray Papke,
Problems with an Uninvited Guest:  Richard A. Posner and the Law and Literature
Movement , 69 B.U. L. REV. 1067, 1067-69 (1989) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER,
LAW AND LITERATURE:  A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION (1988)) (referring to the
text as “influential” and White as “the most prominent figure in the modern law and
literature movement”).
20 See WHITE, supra  note 17, at xx-xxi (explaining how he intended the text to be R
used in the classroom).
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Nearly a thousand pages in length, it begins by addressing the
student individually, extolling the virtue of applying his or her
personal experience to the study of law.21  Professor White char-
acterizes the act of learning and practicing the law as deeply per-
sonal, where the individual skills and weaknesses of the student
and practitioner should be recognized.22  Thus, he seeks not to
teach the student the “science” of law, but rather to contribute to
the self-actualization of the student as an “artist,” or literary law-
yer.23  The law student, like an art student given canvas or clay
with instruction in their operation but essentially left alone to
create, is given the artistic lawyer’s medium of rules elsewhere.24
It is for Professor White, like the art teacher, to instruct not in
the usage of rules, but in how to critique and speculate.25
The text, made up predominantly of various works of literature
from short stories to essays on linguistics, attempts to engage the
student through the Socratic technique of questioning.26  Each
21 Id. at xxxiv-xxxv.
22 See id.  at xxxiv.
23 See id.  at xxxiv-xxxv.
24 Id.  at xxxv.
25 See id. ; James Boyd White, Law as Language:  Reading Law and Reading Liter-
ature , 60 TEX. L. REV. 415, 437 (1982) (“Students seek out good teaching to learn
not the rules but the culture, for the rules are everywhere the same.”).
26 By Socratic discourse, I mean a classical approach to problem solving and argu-
ment as exemplified by Socrates.  According to White, the classic Socratic exchange
is composed of “two minds . . . engaged with each other, responding and pushing,
the movement of the argument is from disagreement to agreement, and then (it is
hoped) to new agreement on the matter in dispute.” WHITE, supra  note 17, at 821; R
see also  James Boyd White, What Can a Lawyer Learn from Literature? , 102 HARV.
L. REV. 2014, 2018 (1989) (reviewing POSNER, supra  note 19).  For good descriptions R
of two different conceptions of the Socratic technique, see Clark D. Cunningham,
Learning from Law Students:  A Socratic Approach to Law and Literature? , 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 195, 201-03 (1994) (distinguishing White’s version of the Socratic
method from the more widely understood “Kingsfieldian” technique, which was
named from the professor in the film The Paper Chase  and consists mainly of
badgering students with questions that increase their anxiety), and Andrew J. Mc-
Clurg, Poetry in Commotion: Katko v. Briney and the Bards of First-Year Torts , 74
OR. L. REV. 823, 830 (attributing many of the “creative failings” of the law class-
room to the Socratic method, which consists of questions to which the law professor
has “prefabricated answers”).  Professor McClurg also laments the dearth of partici-
pation by law students:
Watching .  It is what the vast majority of law students do best in the
classroom.  And who can blame them?  After seeing the Socratic method in
action a couple of times, the decision to stay on the sidelines is an entirely
logical one.  Indeed, participating—volunteering one’s ideas—is somewhat
illogical given the certain knowledge that every word spoken will be sub-
jected to rigorous critical scrutiny.  Why should we expect rational human
beings to willingly expose themselves to the risk of public ridicule for such
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chapter begins with a short introduction followed by a series of
literary excerpts, which are each in turn accompanied by a series
of questions posed by Professor White for the student to an-
swer.27  Each chapter ends with a writing assignment for the stu-
dent to complete.28  His unique approach replaces the case
excerpts and statutes that are the staples of the typical law text
with works as varied and diverse as Herman Melville’s Billy
Budd29  or William Labov’s 1969 study on nonstandard Negro
English (NNE), The Logic of Nonstandard English .30  Through
his pointed questioning, he challenges the reader to look deeper
into the texts than a tertiary reading would allow.  He asks the
students to identify how the author, in creating an environment
through language, establishes the roles that the reader and au-
thor play.  He wants students to place themselves in the role of
the writer to better understand the relationship the author seeks
to create with the language, and better evaluate the effectiveness
of the writer’s control over language.
Control, traditionally at least, has been exerted by authors
over language using three rhetorical devices:  metaphor, irony,
and ambiguity.31  Professor White instructs the student in their
usage, both through example by providing literary excerpts, and
through a line of questioning intended to reveal how, as an indi-
vidual, the reader regards the work—thus demonstrating how ef-
fective metaphor, irony, and ambiguity can be in controlling the
language.  The use of metaphor, irony, and ambiguity, however,
are frequently restricted to the users of ordinary language and
not typically available to legal language users.32  This distinction
little gain?  Watching in silence becomes an almost instinctive survival
maneuver.
Id.  at 848.
27 See, e.g. , WHITE, supra  note 17, 7-10. R
28 See, e.g. , id.  at 34-37.
29 Id.  at 70-73.
30 Id.  at 27-32.
31 Id.  at 57.  It is instructive that White provides examples of these three literary
tools and encourages readers “to analyze how others have controlled their lan-
guage” to help them through their own struggles with language Id.  The good law-
yer will utilize these techniques as well, but in a far more limited capacity.  For
example, White notes that “our Constitution is certainly ambiguous, and irony is
often heard in the courtroom.” Id.
32 Throughout his work, Professor White highlights the difference between “ordi-
nary language” (i.e., normal, everyday communication) and “legal language” (i.e.,
the language utilized by law students, lawyers, and judges), noting that they have
features in common but differ in many ways. See, e.g. , id. at 57, 76-77, 81, 188.
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between the ordinary language users and legal language users is a
prominent theme throughout the text and receives serious atten-
tion in the section on the lawyer’s distinct power of language
making.33
While Professor White acknowledges that the lawyer and law
student work within a specific legal language and that the mas-
tery of the language of law is important to their success, the true
mark of a successful attorney is her relationship with the lan-
guage—the use and control of the language and the language’s
use and control of the attorney.34  Through practice and example
the student will be better prepared to write, and evaluate, the
writings of legal texts—skills that are frequently neglected in
traditional legal curricula.  Unlike the writer of literature, the le-
gal writer makes the language system she uses.35  That is to say,
the lawyer, judge, or legislator can argue for the reformation of
the language or, if a judge, can decree its change.36  Therefore,
one distinct advantage the lawyer has over the poet or novelist is
that if the lawyer does not like what she sees her language system
doing, she can argue for its change.37  Thus, the lawyer can recon-
stitute the relationship between the writer and reader, thereby
shaping the boundaries within which the legal culture itself is
constituted.38
Professor White’s approach calls for the legal writer to view
her work from both inside and outside the realm of legal dis-
course.  To successfully create the right relationship with the lan-
guage of law, the writer must be conscious of how she speaks of
the law outside of the professional context, as well as how the
33 See id.  at 77; see also  discussion infra  Part II.A.
34 See WHITE, supra  note 17, at 765 (“[S]uccess for the artist was defined as a
relationship with language, as a way of making his words work to his will, differenti-
ating his statement from all others.”).  Also, for an in-depth article on The Legal
Imagination , with an especially detailed account of the use of language in the law,
see Thomas D. Eisele, The Legal Imagination and Language:  A Philosophical Criti-
cism , 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 363, 372 (1976).
35 See, e.g. , JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW:  ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC
AND POETICS OF THE LAW xii (1985) (“[E]very time we act as lawyers we create and
claim a set of meanings:  about the events, about the institutions of which we are
part, about the very language in which we speak; and for the meanings that we make
we are deeply responsible.”).
36 WHITE, supra  note 17, at 77. R
37 Id.
38 Id.  This approach will become especially relevant when this Comment exam-
ines Justice Douglas’s opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut . See infra  Part III.B.1.
Additionally, in Part II, the discussion concerning the “culture of argument” ad-
dresses the subject in far greater detail. See infra  Part II.A.
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legal language is used within the legal setting.39  Furthermore, to
efficiently utilize the relationship between the writer and the lan-
guage, the lawyer must be aware of what is left out—to stand
outside of the language and express recognition of what is miss-
ing.  Through this multifaceted approach, the user of the legal
language will become cognizant of how legal language is both
inexorably linked to ordinary language, while still distinct in its
nature.  In utilizing the legal language from within while turning
a critical eye on it from without, the legal language user will be
better able to note, and hopefully rectify, the paucity and inade-
quacies of legal language vis-à-vis ordinary language.40
Therefore, Professor White asks in The Legal Imagination  that
law students move outside of the traditionally understood realm
of legal study.  While they must still utilize the various media of
law (rules and statutes), they must also understand the tools and
techniques of literature so that they may better scrutinize and
critique legal writing, and in turn create a better alternative.
With this mission in mind, the Law and Literature movement was
born; while its theorists and students are often at odds, and fre-
quently acrimonious, the common theme of utilizing literature to
further the practice of law remains the primary goal among the
movement’s diverging schools of thought.41
With Professor White’s goal in mind, this Comment will at-
tempt to move away from the traditionally understood, result-
oriented reading of Griswold v. Connecticut .  Rather, in examin-
ing the opinion through the prism of prominent theories of judi-
cial interpretation from the Law and Literature school, this
Comment shows how what may appear at first blush as a straight-
forward case of constitutional overreach or judicial activism can
be read as much more.
II
THEORIES ON JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
To attempt to encapsulate each theory of judicial interpreta-
tion posited by Law and Literature scholars in a succinct all-
encompassing whole would be a Herculean task.  Therefore, se-
39 WHITE, supra  note 17, at 50.
40 See id.
41 See MINDA, supra  note 10, at 151-52; Pantazakos, supra  note 11, at 41-42 (“The R
carping criticism of the movement’s eclectic disorganization is thus, in my opinion,
misguided . . . .”).
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lected works and articles from within Law and Literature have
been chosen for their preeminence within each field and their
relevance to the goal at hand, i.e., interpreting Griswold .  First,
Professor White’s theory of judicial interpretation will be posited
as both an amalgamation of the law-in-literature and law-as-liter-
ature schools, and also as an overview of an effective model to be
employed.  Next, Professor Weisberg’s paradigm of the law-as-
literature school of thought, How Judges Speak:  Some Lessons
on Adjudication in Billy Budd, Sailor with an Application to Jus-
tice Rehnquist , will be examined with a particularly close look at
Weisberg’s theory on the manipulative power of certain forms of
adjudicative language.  Finally, Professor Levinson’s Law as
Literature  will provide an overview of alternative theories of con-
stitutional and judicial interpretations, along with critiques of rel-
evant schools of thought.
A. Professor White’s Culture of Argument
Professor White has articulated a theory of judicial interpreta-
tion that calls for an understanding of the relationship between
the author and reader focusing on the literary way in which their
community, or culture, is formed.42  According to White, it is not
enough to search a text for its “true meaning”—as if, contained
within the text, there is a key to unlocking the author or authors’
intent.43  Rather, one must interpret the culture created by the
authors and readers of judicial writings by examining the interac-
tion between the two.44  The law in its broadest terms is the “con-
stitution of a world by the distribution of authority within it; it
establishes the terms on which its actors may talk in conflict or
cooperation among themselves.”45  Far more than a set of rules
and doctrines or a bureaucratic construct intent on social control,
the law is a culture.46  As in any culture, law establishes roles and
relationships, voices and positions from which one may speak,
and audiences that one may reach.47  It gives the speakers the
materials and methods of the conversation.48  It is a culture re-
42 See JAMES BOYD WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION:  AN ESSAY IN CULTURAL
AND LEGAL CRITICISM 91 (1990).
43 See WHITE, supra  note 2, at 19. R
44 See id.  at 15-19.
45 Id. at 266.
46 Id.  at 267.
47 Id.  at 266.
48 See id.  at 267.
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plete with its own language—a language focused on the process
of agreement and disagreement, within which both the legal cul-
ture and our broader culture are defined and transformed.49
The give and take, or back and forth, that shapes legal dis-
course plays a prominent role in the larger legal argument.50
Like a pendulum swinging from one end to another, the language
is shaped amid the extremes of two opposing positions, within
the realm of concession and compromise.51  Here, in the middle,
after each proposal for change has been made, the individual at-
torney must accept what she cannot change.  This mutual conces-
sion creates a common language that makes the dispute
intelligible and the community possible.  Arguments ultimately
breed agreement, because nothing is gained in argument by re-
fusing to move from a strictly held position.  Thus, in forcing
agreement, “the law makes disagreement at once intelligible, lim-
ited, and amenable to resolution.”52
The same can be said for the disagreements that pervade the
broader American culture:  it is within the middle ground of con-
cession that the language of argument is formed.  For only
through compromise can a discernible language of debate be
fashioned.  As in the legal culture, with its language of argument,
it is the compromise of the judicial opinion, the back and forth
between the extremes, that shapes the broader American culture
and becomes the battlefield upon which our greater cultural wars
are fought.  Thus, one of the primary functions of the culture of
argument is to provide a rhetorical coherence to public life by
compelling those who disagree about an issue to express their
disagreements articulately.
In the most important sense, this constituting and reconstitut-
ing of our language or legal culture takes place in the judicial
49 Id.
50 Id.
51 See id.  at 267-68.  White’s basic premise is very much like Hegel’s three-step
dialectic process of “thesis, antithesis, synthesis” presented in Hegel’s Philosophy of
History . See PETER SINGER, HEGEL:  A VERY SHORT INTRODUCTION 100-03
(2001).  Namely, that a “thesis” (e.g., the Ancient Greek community built on “cus-
tomary morality”) would cause the creation of its “antithesis” (e.g., a world that
promotes the “right of individual conscience” such as the Reformation), and would
eventually result in a “synthesis” (e.g., the “German society of Hegel’s time” be-
cause it was an “organic community” that still preserved “individual freedom”). Id.
at 100-02.
52 WHITE, supra  note 2, at 268.  Thus, in many ways attorneys, judges, and legisla- R
tors are “creating” their own language. See id. ; see also supra  note 35. R
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opinion, where the collective attempts to come to terms with a
legal or social problem are best exemplified.53  However, before
discussing the judicial opinion, one must examine the document
about which these fundamental disputes have frequently arisen:
the United States Constitution.
1. The Constitution
It is through the Preamble that the Constitution purports to
speak through one unanimous voice.54  Under the Preamble, the
Constitution merges the people of the United States, including
the reader, into a single, self-constituting identity.55  Thus, “the
People” constitutes both the author and audience of the docu-
ment.56  The “We” is an energetic and youthful voice of a people
on the move striving to form a “more perfect [u]nion.”57  Thus, in
order to “establish,” “insure,” “provide for,” “promote,” and
“secure” this ideal form of life, a perfect unity must be main-
tained—but only long enough to deal with the emergency of the
moment.58  For it is only in the Preamble that the Constitution
speaks as one unanimous voice.  Once in the body of the docu-
ment, the energetic proclamation of unity labeled “the People” is
divided into many separate, self-interested parts:  the various of-
fices, separate states, different office holders, and the citizens.59
The voice of the Constitution becomes far more authoritative
after the Preamble.  The document is no longer speaking to us as
part of the collective “We”; the address now has a tone that is
both definitive in what it allows and revealing in its silence.60
The document is no longer concerned with principle.  Rather, it
focuses on the details of government, defining the powers of each
branch and how, notwithstanding an amendment, those powers
are final.  Once the Constitution establishes its right over the
people as a whole, the people are free to go their separate ways.
53 See WHITE, supra  note 42, at 89-90. R
54 See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States, in Order to form
a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty
to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the
United States of America.”).
55 WHITE, supra  note 2, at 240. R
56 Id.
57 Id.  at 240-41.
58 Id.  at 241.
59 Id.
60 See id.
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They are free to compete in trade and political affairs, pursue
conflicting interests, form disparate organizations, and seek and
exercise power, so long as they do so in accordance with the Con-
stitution’s original mandate.61
However, because of the ingrained inertness of the Constitu-
tion, the citizenry is compelled to find answers in the courts, the
ultimate arbitrator of constitutional discourse.  The Court,
through its unique form of expression, the judicial opinion,
shapes the contours and rough edges of the Constitution.  Ex-
pressive in ways the Constitution is silent, the judicial opinion
dictates how differing interests should interact, where and how
rights and power are allotted, and the extent to which the gov-
ernment interacts with the citizenry.62  Thus, the judicial opinion,
even more than the Constitution, shapes and directs our culture.
2. The Judicial Opinion
Unlike the President and Congress, the Supreme Court is
given no explicit power by the Constitution to operate on its
own.  Rather, it must wait until it is asked, by others, to act.63
Once the conflicting parties come before the Court and present
their views via briefs and oral arguments, the Court reaches a
decision and speaks publicly on the issue.  This pronouncement
announces changes in the manner in which future actors interact;
it fills in the silent contours of the Constitution.  However, with
every pronouncement, one side or movement is left feeling
slighted.  Thus, the judicial opinion acts as both a harbinger of
change and a future forum for criticism.
At its most fundamental level, the judicial opinion is a conver-
sation.64  Each individual or group speaks to another:  the liti-
gants speak to one another in their briefs, the judges or justices
speak to one another through their individual opinions, and the
court speaks to future generations through the publication of the
opinion.  The judicial opinion is not created in a vacuum.  There
is a give and take, a kind of jostling and conciliation, to its crea-
61 Id.
62 See id.  at 264 (using McCulloch v. Maryland , 17 U.S. 36 (1819), as an example
of how “the judicial opinion is . . . not an isolated exercise of power but part of a
continuing and collective process of conversation and judgment”).
63 Id. at 247.  “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and Treatises made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
64 Id.  at 264.
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tion.  It focuses primarily on the highly formal authoritative ques-
tion at hand while being cognizant of the ruling’s effects on the
future.  In this way, the judicial opinion shapes culture,
“acknowledg[ing] the necessity of cultural change and creat[ing]
a method for effecting it.”65  Rather than occurring in isolation,
the process looks to the past for its authority and speaks to the
future as authority to be followed.66  Thus, the judicial opinion is
itself a self-conscious instrument of change.
However, with each disposition of a conflict there will be a
“winner” and a “loser.”  But it is not enough for the losing side
and its supporters to condemn the judicial opinion for its failure
to take their side.  Indeed, it is insufficient to criticize an opinion
for deciding a case “wrongly,” or to disagree with an opinion for
political, moral, or policy reasons, though this is obviously the
most prevalent form of criticism judicial opinions face in our cul-
ture today.  To “look through” the text of the opinion, to find in
the result of the case something more, is to ignore the fact that
the law is unique.67  To search for answers to the results of opin-
ions in the fields of sociology, psychology, or economics is to ig-
nore the legal nature of the opinion and regard it solely in terms
of policy or politics.68  This “legal realism,” or results-centered
approach, denies what the law is at its most fundamental:  the
interpretation and composition of authoritative texts.69
Therefore, in applying literary criticism to the judicial opinion,
it is far more relevant to analyze the process of supplication and
ask how or from where the judge’s authority is obtained and
maintained.  Did the judge or judges draw the authority to rule
from a document like the Constitution, or was the ruling a prod-
uct of judicial fiat?  Is the ruling derivative of the democratic pro-
cess, or is it the whim of one or more individuals appointed for
life?  To answer these questions and effectively critique judicial
opinions, Professor White instructs us to focus on three interre-
65 Id.
66 Id. ; see also  1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 59-60
(1991) (arguing generally that the Supreme Court preserves past constitutional peri-
ods by invoking precedent and articulates the revolutionary changes brought about
by the popularly elected officials during different “constitutional regimes”).
67 WHITE, supra  note 42, at 95. R
68 Id.
69 See id.  For a thorough critique of “legal realism” see PAUL W. KAHN, THE
REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA 42-
44 (1997), in which the author posits a theory of legal interpretation he dubbed
“archeology.”
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lated points of interest concerning judicial authority:  the lan-
guage and culture within which the judges, as writers, work; the
act by which judges reconstitute language as they use it; and the
kind of community judges establish with readers through the ex-
perience offered by their opinions.70
While Professor White works in a realm that easily blends the
tenets of the two divergent schools of thought within Law and
Literature, it is necessary to examine each in turn to better un-
derstand the potential of the movement as a whole.  Within Law
and Literature, the two dominant “intellectual axes”71 remain as
articulated prior to the evolution of the movement:  law-in-
literature and law-as-literature.
B. Professor Weisberg and Law-in-Literature
The law-in-literature movement evolved from compiling and
chronicling legal literary works72 to a more sophisticated use of
literature to examine and better understand how legal themes,
such as revenge and guilt, operated within our culture.73  From
comparing Kafka’s views on human motivation with Posner’s
theories on law and economics,74 to reading Charles Dickens to
formulate a theory of ethical adjudication,75 law-in-literature
scholars, through critique and examination, seek to discover an-
swers to our culture’s fundamental moral and adjudicative issues
within the Great Books of literature.  In 1982, Richard Weisberg
had done just that.
In his article How Judges Speak:  Some Lessons on Adjudica-
tion in  Billy Budd, Sailor with an Application to Justice Rehn-
quist , Professor Weisberg provides an example of how law-in-
literature theory can be used to critique specific instances of al-
70 WHITE, supra note 42, at 99.
71 Pantazakos, supra  note 11, at 38-39. R
72 Id. at 38; see also supra  note 15.  Dean John Wigmore’s work best exemplifies R
the early law-in-literature movement. See, e.g. , John H. Wigmore, A List of Legal
Novels , 2 ILL. L. REV. 574 (1908).
73 See MINDA, supra  note 10, at 150; see also  Dunlop, supra  note 19, at 63 R
(describing law-in-literature as “the study of representations of the legal order in
fiction, usually novels and plays”).
74 See  Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice:  The Role of Consent in the
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner , 99 HARV. L. REV.
384, 386 (1985).
75 See  Michael K. McChrystal, At the Foot of the Master:  What Charles Dickens
Got Right About What Lawyers Do Wrong , 78 OR. L. REV. 393, 402-04 (1999).
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legedly objective judicial behavior.76  Here, Professor Weisberg
illustrates how language, as utilized in Melville’s novella Billy
Budd , can establish an authoritative force even when the analyti-
cal logic of the argument is flawed.77
Professor Weisberg thoroughly summarizes the novella’s main
plot, a trial at which the stutter-struck and naively “overt” sailor,
Billy Budd, is convicted and sentenced to death by Captain Vere
and his devious and sophisticatedly “covert” master-at-arms,
John Claggart.78  Through this summary, Professor Weisberg ar-
ticulates Melville’s main theory of adjudicatory communication:
the considerate technique.79  “Considerate communication,” as
Weisberg interpreted Melville, consists of three elements in the
relationship between the speaker or author and the audience.80
First, the communicator’s primary motive must be the well-being
of the audience, regardless of any secondary motives.81  Second,
any factual distortions must consist of omissions or minor insig-
nificant misstatements of fact.82  Finally, the speaker or author
must convey the essence of the underlying message, despite the
omissions or minor misrepresentations of detail.83  News ac-
counts that subtly manipulate the facts to present a more patri-
otic message utilize this considerate technique, and are regarded,
at least by Melville, as nonpejorative.84  It is for the greater good
that a journalist may exercise soothing, paternalistic verbal con-
trol over her audience in order to preserve or bolster morale at
home.85  It is only when this technique fails to consider the
greater good of the audience, or is utilized for the communica-
tor’s personal advantage as a tool to manipulate, that Melville
76 Richard Weisberg, How Judges Speak:  Some Lessons on Adjudication in  Billy
Budd, Sailor with an Application to Justice Rehnquist , 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 5 (1982).
77 Id.  at 34.
78 Id.  at 9.  Weisberg uses the terms “overt” and “covert” to describe Billy Budd’s
“innate openness” and to juxtapose it with Claggert’s “ingratiating indirectness”:
two “types in opposition” throughout the novella that are further highlighted by the
land-based and sea-based juxtaposition present throughout Melville’s entire work.
Id.
79 Id.  at 34-35.




84 Melville’s accounts of mutinies at sea by reporters exemplify the considerate
approach and are intentionally juxtaposed with Captain Vere’s bastardization of the
technique. Id.  at 36-37.
85 Id.  at 37.
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condemns the speaker or author.86
Melville’s portrayal of the trial of Billy Budd speaks to the per-
suasive force of the considerate technique.  Captain Vere, despite
numerous facts and adjudicative hurdles that should have limited
a verdict against Billy to no more than manslaughter, manages to
convince the drumhead court that Billy was attempting to incite
mutiny and should be executed.  Therefore, Vere’s use of the
considerate technique, ultimately masking the procedural and
substantive weaknesses in his argument in order to condemn the
good-hearted Billy, is both a gross manipulation of the method,
and, on a much broader level after the hanging, a warning to be-
ware the corrosive effects of an overly rigid form of adjudication,
devoid of morality and ethics.
What then can an understanding of a masterful piece of litera-
ture, such as Melville’s Billy Budd , lend to the practice of law?
The answer is far from simple, and, depending on the approach
chosen, it can be as varied and multifarious as the different meta-
phors in Melville’s works.  However, within law-in-literature,
Professor Weisberg effectively analogizes the communicative
technique employed by Captain Vere with those used by Justice
Rehnquist in Paul v. Davis .87  In doing so, he demonstrates, in
the abstract at least, that within literature there operates persua-
sive techniques of communication frequently employed in judi-
cial opinions.  By learning to identify and critique the
implementation of these techniques in literature, the legal reader
will be better served to discover their use in the adjudicative set-
ting.  Furthermore, by showing the way in which “language fre-
quently controls the outcome of adjudication” and how some of
the narrative techniques employed by Melville are present in Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s opinion in Paul v. Davis ,88 his article acts as
both a warning and as a condemnation of considerate
communication.
Professor Weisberg likens Justice Rehnquist, the “considerate
communicator” in Paul v. Davis , to Captain Vere in Billy Budd ,
and asks the reader not to critique the legal analysis in the opin-
ion, but rather to “appreciate the cleverly persuasive manner in
86 Captain Vere’s use of the considerate technique is questioned when it is re-
vealed that he operates out of a personal desire to see Billy hanged. Id.  at 37-38.
87 See id.  at 43-58 (discussing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
88 Id. at 5.  For an informative analysis of Weisberg’s article, see MINDA, supra
note 10, at 153-55. R
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which Justice Rehnquist, ever considerate of his audience’s
needs, uses language to dispel critical probing into his logic and
use of precedent.”89  Professor Weisberg begins by juxtaposing
the various recitations of the “facts” of the case, illustrating how
the subjective way in which the case is presented, either by Jus-
tice Rehnquist or as it is portrayed in a law review comment by
Curtis Henry Jacobsen,90 alters the emotive effect on the
reader.91
Justice Rehnquist, for example, emphasized the suspicious na-
ture of Davis’s arrest for shoplifting, while contrasting that im-
agery with the devoted police officers who sought nothing more
than to prevent crime during the Christmas season.92  Through
this presentation, Justice Rehnquist subtly places in the reader’s
mind a notion that Davis is the criminal on trial, and that the
officers were doing nothing more than their jobs.93  Thus,
through subtle techniques such as referring to Davis’s shoplifting
charge as being “finally dismissed” (as though his innocence
should be doubted because of how long the dismissal was in com-
ing), Justice Rehnquist plants the seeds of doubt regarding Da-
vis’s claim for libel.94  Conversely, Jacobsen begins with a quote
from Othello  expressing the value of one’s reputation over mere
personal possessions.95  Jacobsen describes the proceedings in
terms related to Davis’s libel, rather than Davis’s dismissed shop-
lifting charge.96  While Justice Rehnquist portrayed the police of-
ficers as the protagonist and Davis as the antagonist, Jacobsen
portrays Davis as a victim deserving of a remedy and the police
officers as the perpetrators of a crime.97
Moving from how the facts are expressed to the manner in
which the law is utilized, Professor Weisberg examines Rehn-
89 Weisberg, supra  note 76, at 43. R
90 Curtis Henry Jacobsen, Comment, Paul v. Davis: The Taming of 1983 , 43
BROOKLYN L. REV. 147 (1976).
91 Weisberg, supra  note 76, at 44-45.  Professor Weisberg acknowledges that “it is R
of course impossible to restate any fact situation without adding subjective color to
the pristine original reality.” Id.  at 44.
92 Id.  at 45.
93 See id.
94 Id.  (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 696 (1975)).
95 Jacobsen, supra  note 90, at 147 (“Who steals my purse steals trash; ‘tis some- R
thing, nothing; / Twas mine, ‘tis his, and has been slave to thousands. / But he that
filches from me my good name / Robs me of that which not enriches him, / And
makes me poor indeed.”) (quoting WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO act III, sc. 3).
96 Id.  at 147-48.
97 Weisberg, supra  note 76, at 44. R
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quist’s “deneutralization” of the law.98  From his subtle question-
ing of the Court’s jurisdiction by suggesting the case involved
merely defamation fit for Kentucky courts,99 to his utilization of
the “slippery slope” argument by portraying Davis’s action as
opening the flood gate of superfluous claims against law enforce-
ment officers,100 Justice Rehnquist is shown to mirror Captain
Vere through his use of mischaracterization and exaggerated hy-
potheticals.101  Like Captain Vere, whose underlying message is
that Billy presents a threat to the order of the entire empire, Jus-
tice Rehnquist depicted Davis’s claim as challenging the entirety
of our legal order.102  Thus, Melville’s vision of a considerate
communicator is exemplified in both Captain Vere and Justice
Rehnquist, as each seeks to provide his court with a litigant who,
for the greater good, cannot be allowed to prevail.103
Professor Weisberg’s article is illustrative of the law-in-litera-
ture movement as a whole.  It seeks to utilize a literary work to
illuminate a theme in modern jurisprudence.  More specifically, it
examines “the values and normative structures likely to inhere in
many judges today,” and how those values “may pose barriers to
objective judicial behavior.”104  Thus, a tale like Billy Budd  is far
more than an examination of the human condition or Melville’s
moral critique of a specific instance of judicial imperfection; it is
a tool that can be utilized to examine ways in which legal texts
are convincing or authoritative, as it illustrates the power that the
masterful use of language can have in an adjudicative setting.
Professor Weisberg’s article demonstrates how a seemingly ob-
jective opinion, such as that written by Justice Rehnquist in Paul
v. Davis , can contain much more than a tertiary reading will re-
veal.  It shows how a skeptical reader, conscious of literary tech-
98 Id . at 45-49.
99 Paul , 424 U.S. at 698 (“Concededly if the same allegations had been made
about respondent by a private individual, he would have nothing more than a claim
for defamation under state law.  But, he contends, since petitioners are respectively
an official of city and of county government, his action is thereby transmuted into
one for deprivation by the State of rights secured under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
100 Id.  (“If respondent’s view is to prevail, a person arrested by law enforcement
officers who announce that they believe such person to be responsible for a particu-
lar crime in order to calm the fears of an aroused populace, presumably obtains a
claim against such officers under § 1983.”).
101 See  Weisberg, supra  note 76, at 47-49. R
102 Id.  at 49.
103 Id.
104 Id.  at 5.
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niques, can assess a judicial opinion, not for the end result of who
“won,” but rather for how well-reasoned and intellectually hon-
est the opinion is.  For it is not enough to merely critique an opin-
ion that the reader perceives to have a negative result, or attack
one that is not politically agreeable.  In assessing the quality of
an opinion, it is crucial to determine from where the author de-
rived her authority, and how she reached her conclusions.  There-
fore, Professor Weisberg’s article can be read as both a warning
against the persuasive force of “considerate communication” in
the dissemination of justice and a template by which the critical
legal reader can measure those judicial opinions that attempt to
persuade through deceptive means.
To use the Great Books of literature as a guide in assessing
adjudicative writing can be an intellectually fruitful means of cri-
tique.  Others, however, insist that the act of writing, whether in
an opinion or a work of fiction, always involves the same funda-
mental processes.  As such, it requires the same analysis and in-
tellectual examination.  These scholars adhere to the law-as-
literature template and espouse a doctrine that analyzes the
meaning of texts, whether they are constitutions or judicial opin-
ions, to derive the author’s intent.  For it is only with an under-
standing of the text’s meaning that we can effectuate its
commands.
Searching for the “true” meaning of the Constitution is an acri-
monious affair, to say the least.  However, Sanford Levinson’s
Law as Literature105  manages to capture the essence of the
movement, along with the parameters of the debate within it.
C. Professor Levinson and Law as Literature
Sanford Levinson’s aptly titled article “Law as Literature” is
illustrative of the entire law-as-literature movement.  The article
persuasively advocates for literary techniques to be employed in
adjudicatory activities, advances various theories utilized to fur-
ther the law-as-literature discipline, and presents arguments in
defense of, and against, various theorists within the Law and
Literature movement.  Written within the intellectual framework
of literary studies, Professor Levinson’s article demonstrates the
enormous potential of the law-as-literature movement in consti-
tutional scholarship, as well as the philosophical division that
105 Sanford Levinson, Law as Literature , 60 TEX. L. REV. 373 (1982).
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separates various scholars within the field.  Through a thorough
examination of the authors’ purpose in writing the Constitution
and an intellectual critique of the varying ways in which scholars
believe the Constitution can be interpreted, Professor Levinson
lays the groundwork for a theory of constitutional scholarship
that effectively blends law and literature.
The United States is unique (from Britain, for example) be-
cause politicians, citizens, and judges argue not necessarily the
ethical or moral implications of a particular issue, but rather
whether the issue comports with the dictates of a comprehensible
Constitution.106  This constitutional comprehensibility is derived
from the very fact that it is written.107  While to hear someone
speak or see someone move requires the interpretation of a lis-
tener or viewer, it is thought that by writing an idea, its true
meaning is preserved in perpetuity.  However, literary criticism
has shown that a written work’s very “writtenness” presents an
illusory authoritativeness.108  Merely relying on the fact that
something is written to ensure that its meaning is preserved is to
erroneously overvalue the ability of the text to transcend time
and make its meaning known.  Furthermore, by utilizing the
works of literary theorists, Professor Levinson shows that the
writing of the text for future generations acts to “harden” the
language, and thus control actions by future readers through its
illusory authoritativeness.109
Constitutions are written to “freeze time,” for it is the lack of
faith in subsequent generations that constitutional drafters ad-
dress by crafting the document in the first place.110  Thus, it is
through its very language that a constitution retains its authority
or defers its meaning for later readers to interpret or decipher.
Because ultimately retaining its authority was the primary goal of
106 Id. at 375.
107 Id.
108 Id.  (“The physical presentation of a text . . . gives it a stability . . . . Writing has
something of a character of an inscription, a mark offered to the world and promis-
ing, by its solidity and apparent autonomy, meaning which is momentarily de-
ferred.”) (quoting the literary theorist Jonathan Culler in STRUCTURALIST POETICS
131, 134 (1975)).
109 Id. (citing the literary theorist Jonathan Culler and the French critic Roland
Barthes to illustrate the power of the written work, especially in controlling the ac-
tions of future generations).
110 If the crafters of the Constitution had confidence in future generations, why
not just intone them to “be good” or “do what you think best”? Id.  at 376.  The role
of the Constitution is to control future activity, by proscribing some actions while
allowing others. Id.
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the drafters, the “hardening” of a constitution’s language takes
on great importance, and as such the writers of constitutions
must have great faith in the ability of language to both “harden”
and control.111
However, the meaning of a word as written in the eighteenth
century can change to mean something entirely different in the
modern context.  Thus, because the “hardening” of a work is
greatly limited by the changing nature of language, any writer,
including the framers of constitutions, must imagine a relation-
ship between the reader and the text whereby the reader at-
tempts to make out what the writer means by “putting into play a
linguistic and literary expertise that he shares with the au-
thor.”112  Thus, by assuming what the author sought to signify,
the reader attempts to understand what the language of the work
means, and, in the legal context, what the reader is authorized to
enforce.113  This attempt by the reader to ascertain the meaning
of the text through a shared understanding with the author
should be applied by judges to constitutional interpretation.
Therefore, in treating law as literature, the constitutional theorist
will be better prepared than the legal textualist, who searches for
meaning only within the text, to ascertain the intended meaning
of the Constitution.
While Professor Levinson dismisses “originalist” theories as
“increasingly without defenders,” he recognizes and addresses
the viability of a textualist approach to the Constitution.114  Al-
though he likens the sole reliance on the text of the Constitution
to construe its meaning to viewing the document “through a glass
darkly,”115 he provides two options for those who remain inter-
ested in interpreting the actual text and gleaning objective mean-
111 Id.
112 Id. (quoting M.H. Abrams, How to Do Things with Texts , 46 PARTISAN REV.
566 (1979)).
113 Id.
114 Id.  at 378.  Professor Levinson goes on to say:
There is not time in this essay to canvass the problems of originalism.
Suffice it to say that the plain meaning approach inevitably breaks down in
the face of the reality of disagreement among equally competent speakers
of the native tongue.  Intentionality arguments, on the other hand, face not
only the problem of explaining why intentions of long-dead people from a
different social world should influence us, but also, perhaps more impor-
tantly, the problem of extracting intentions from the collectivity of individ-
uals and institutions necessary to give legal validity to the Constitution.
Id. at 379.
115 Id.  at 378.
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ing from it free of its outside influence:  weak textualism and
strong textualism.116
Weak textualists are characterized as attempting to break the
text’s code through the utilization of a scientific method of criti-
cism.117  The meaning of the text, according to the weak textual-
ist, will be revealed in the overall structure of the document.  The
reader must read “between the lines” to reveal the abstract com-
position that determines the documents “one-and-only truth.”118
Thus, the Constitution can be authoritatively said to yield its
meaning in the “interplay of conceptual structures—states, na-
tion, citizens, republican government—that are undoubtedly pre-
sent in the constitutional text.”119  However, this technique
presupposes the vocabulary that reveals the true essence of the
Constitution because the very terms contained within the Consti-
tution are continually used to define it.120  Because weak textual-
ists maintain the belief that there is something contained in the
Constitution that can be determined by the utilization of the
proper method, they in many ways embody the law-as-science
archetype and act as the discredited Langdellian121 searching for
the proper principle with which to break the code.122
The “strong” textualist (called such to emphasize the power of
the critic, not the text) rejects the whole idea of searching for the
meaning of a text.123  The reading of a text for its meaning is a
passive and illusorily self-satisfying approach because the true
meaning of the text is created by each reader.  Texts provide an
illusory objectiveness in that their meaning appears self-con-
tained.124  The strong textualist emphasizes the reader’s active
116 Id.  at 379-81 (describing Richard Rorty’s characterization of the two courses
of analysis left open to those “interested in interpreting the relevant texts”).
117 Id.  at 380.




121 See id.  at 373-74 (referring to Christopher Langdell’s “false science” of the
law).
122 Id.  at 381.
123 Id.  (describing Stanley Fish as the leading proponent of the “strong” textualist
approach).
124 Id.  (“The objectivity of the text is an illusion and, moreover, a dangerous illu-
sion, because it is so physically convincing.  The illusion is one of self-sufficiency and
completeness.  A line of print or a page is so obviously there  . . . that it seems to be
the sole repository of whatever value and meaning we associate with it.”) (quoting
STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?:  THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRE-
TIVE COMMUNITIES 327 (1989)) (omission in original).
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-3\ORE305.txt unknown Seq: 25  9-APR-07 14:35
2006] Black and White 877
role in creating meaning from texts, rather than the disinterested,
impersonal approach professed by the weak textualists.125  The
approach taken by strong textualists, however, does not attempt
to defend the position that any explanation is just as good as any
other.126  Rather, it advocates an individual interpretation and is
willing to give up on the notion that a collective meaning can be
ascertained.  Thus, for the “strong” textualist, it is enough that
readers find an interpretation of the text to their liking.  Any-
thing more, any attempt to ascertain a universal meaning, is an
“exercise in social deception” utilized by the reader to shape the
text to serve her own meaning.127  Thus, we are in no position to
say that an interpretation by one judge or justice is more “right”
than any other; we can only acknowledge that the judge or jus-
tice, in reading and interpreting the Constitution, is simply fulfil-
ling his own political vision.128
Therefore, like the frustrated viewer of art or reader of litera-
ture who must turn to critics and literati to return the stability of
meaning to the art form, American lawyers who search for mean-
ing in the Constitution must inevitably look to the Court’s prece-
dents to stabilize and define the document.  In a time when the
Court lacks a prominent “strong” textualist, there are many dif-
ferent Constitutions—all devoid of any substantive meaning and
open to each individual to interpret as she sees fit.129
125 Id.  (“[D]ifferent notions of what it is to read . . . are finally different notions of
what it is to be human.  In [one] view, the world, or the world of the text, is already
ordered and filled with significances and what the reader is required to do is get
them out (hence the question, ‘What did you get out of that?’).  In short, the
reader’s job is to extract the meanings that formal patterns possess prior to, and
independently of, his activities.  In my view [on the other hand], these same activities
are constitutive of a structure of concerns which is necessarily prior to any examina-
tion of meaningful patterns because it is itself the occasion of their coming into be-
ing.”) (quoting FISH, supra  note 124, at 94, regarding his characterization of the R
difference between weak and strong textualists).
126 See id. at 383 (“[W]hatever exists, having somehow come into being, is again
and again reinterpreted to new ends, taken over, transformed, and re-directed by
some power superior to it; all events in the organic world are a subduing, a becoming
master , and all subduing and becoming master involves a fresh interpretation, an
adaptation through which any previous ‘meaning’ and ‘purpose’ are necessarily ob-
scured or even obliterated.”) (quoting FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE GENEALOGY
OF MORALS 77 (Walter Kaufmann & R.J. Hollingdale trans., 1967)).
127 Id.  at 385.
128 Id. at 389 (citing Justices John Marshall, Earl Warren, and William Rehnquist
as “dynamic innovator[s]” of constitutional interpretation).
129 Professor Levinson’s constitutional nihilism has clearly drawn the ire of sev-
eral prominent constitutional and literary theorists.  He directly addresses each op-
ponent, namely Professor Owen Fiss, by articulating what each contends, and then
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Professor Levinson concludes his article without providing an
articulated and cohesive theory with which to interpret the Con-
stitution.  Instead, we are left with the evocation to wait with
faith for a future conjuncture of an author and reader that will
provide a common language of constitutional discourse.  While
this Comment does not presume to create the common language
that he craves, it will attempt to illustrate how the theories of
judicial interpretation, as articulated above, can be applied to
what has become one of the foremost arenas for constitutional
debate: Griswold v. Connecticut .
attacking it.  For example, Professor Fiss first asserts that the judiciary has a
“[s]pecial competence to interpret a text such as the Constitution, and to render
specific and concrete the public morality embodied in that text.” Id. at 394 (quoting
Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and Interpretation , 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982)).  More-
over, Professor Fiss argues that this assignment of authority is structured within lim-
its—the judge is not granted the Nietzschean, or carte blanche, right to create
meaning out of whole cloth. Id. The judge must work within the rules of interpreta-
tion, and within each branch of the law there are specific rules for the varying texts
(e.g., contractual interpretation varies from statutory interpretation and both in turn
vary from constitutional interpretation). Id. Thus, the interpretive process is trans-
formed from a subjective act to an objective one by furnishing the judge with stan-
dards by which the accuracy of the interpretation can be judged.  The rules of
interpretation emanate from the “interpretive community consisting of those who
recognize the rules as authoritative.” Id.
Professor Levinson’s retort to Professor Fiss is limited to questioning the very idea
that there is an interpretive community with a sense of rules that are authoritative.
He counters Professor Fiss by referring to an article recently written by him in which
he and a coauthor criticized Justice Rehnquist for failing to adhere to precedent and
engaging in judicial activism. See id.  at 396-99 (referring to Owen Fiss & Charles
Krauthammer, The Rehnquist Court , NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 10, 1982, at 14, 14-16).  If
the interpretive community creates the rules and objective processes by which
judges interpret the Constitution, then how, rhetorically asks Professor Levinson,
can Professor Fiss write that Justice Rehnquist, as chief interpreter of the Constitu-
tion, is not adhering to the authoritative rules that he has created and is bound to
observe? See  Levinson, supra  note 105, at 396-99.  Ultimately, Professor Fiss’s con- R
ception of the Constitution rests on the optimistic notion that there is no conflict
among the values of the American public, and that judges, as objective observers,
will read the Constitution in such a way as to preserve this coherent set of American
values. Id.  at 399.  However, as his own article makes clear, Professor Fiss fails to
see that the Constitution, rather than reconciling the differing values of the plurality,
has become and will continue to act as the arena in which those differences are
fought. See id.  (quoting BRAY HAMMOND, BANKS AND POLITICS IN AMERICA,
FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR 120 (1957)).
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III
GRISWOLD V. CONNECTICUT
From Griswold  came six written opinions.130  Justice Douglas
wrote the majority opinion, holding that an implicit guarantee
emanated through “penumbras” from the express protections of
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment.  Justice
Goldberg, in a concurring opinion joined by two Justices, found a
constitutionally protected interest among rights the people re-
tained in the express language of the Ninth Amendment.  Justice
Black wrote a powerful dissent, stating that there was no explicit
textual support for a right of privacy, and that by implicating the
Ninth Amendment, the Court opened the door to a whole slew
of rights predicated on the whim of judges.131
A. Facts and Background of the Case
On November 10, 1961, the Executive Director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut, Estelle T. Griswold, and the
Medical Director for the League at its Center in New Haven, Dr.
C. Lee Buxton, were arrested for giving advice and providing
medical services to aid married couples in preventing concep-
tion.132  Both defendants were found guilty of two of the General
Statutes of Connecticut.  The first, section 53-32, provided:
Any person who uses any drug, medicinal article or instrument
for the purpose of preventing conception shall be fined not
less than fifty dollars or imprisoned not less than sixty days
nor more than one year or be both fined and imprisoned.133
The second, section 54-196, sought to punish “[a]ny person
who assists, abets, counsels, causes, hires or commands another
to commit any offense . . . as if he were the principal offender.”134
Both were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each.135
The defendants appealed, and both Connecticut’s Appellate Di-
vision of the Circuit Court and Supreme Court of Errors af-
firmed the judgment.136  The defendants appealed to the U.S.
130 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  For a comprehensive look at
Griswold v. Connecticut , see Helscher, supra note 8.
131 In addition, Justices Harlan and White wrote concurring opinions, and Justice
Stewart wrote a dissenting opinion.
132 Griswold , 381 U.S. at 480.
133 Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53-32 (1958 rev.)).
134 Id.(quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-196).
135 Id.
136 Id.
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Supreme Court and were granted standing to raise the constitu-
tional rights of the married people that they had treated.137  The
Supreme Court ultimately ruled that each of the Connecticut
statutes “unconstitutionally intrudes upon the right of marital
privacy.”138
B. Majority and Concurring Opinions
1. Justice Douglas139
The appellants offered the Court three reasons for overturning
their convictions.  First, they argued that the anticontraceptive
statutes deprived appellants of the right to liberty and property
without due process of law, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment.140  Second, they argued that the statutes violated
due process as an unwarranted invasion of privacy.141  Third,
they argued that the statutes violated the First Amendment.142
In what was ultimately the most controversial path, Justice Doug-
las opted for the second argument, writing that “specific guaran-
tees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”143
He went on to find that the “penumbral” rights that emanated
from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments ac-
ted to create a “zone of privacy” within which the state could not
enter.144
Justice Douglas utilized the power of analogy and precedent to
lend authority to the otherwise rather outrageous assertion that
there is a constitutionally guaranteed right of privacy.145  For no-
137 Id.  at 481. The Court took time to establish the legitimacy of standing by
citing a long line of precedent and distinguishing the case at bar with strictly con-
strued standing requirements articulated in Tileston v. Ullman , 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
Id.
138 Id.  at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
139 Some have suggested that Justice Douglas lent his name to an opinion he did
not craft or compose. See, e.g. , Bernard Schwartz, Supreme Court Superstars:  The
Ten Greatest Justices , 31 TULSA L.J. 93, 147 (1995) (suggesting that Justice Brennan
exerted “behind-the-scenes influence in securing constitutional recognition for the
right of privacy”).  However, for this Comment’s purposes he will be regarded as the
author and source of the ideas contained within the opinion.
140 Brief for Appellants at 21, Griswold , 381 U.S. 479 (No. 496), 1965 WL 115611.
141 Id.  at 79.
142 Id.  at 90.
143 Griswold , 381 U.S. at 484.
144 Id. at 484-85.
145 Drawing on the work of Dorothy J. Glancy, I refer to the right of privacy,
rather than the right to privacy. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Douglas’s Right of Privacy:
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where in the text of the Constitution does the word “privacy”
appear.  Indeed, Connecticut contended that it was well within
the police powers of the state, as prescribed explicitly by the
Constitution, to regulate the dissemination of contraceptives.146
If appellants sought to change the laws, the State argued, they
should do so through the legislative mechanisms provided.147  In
dismissing Connecticut’s arguments, Justice Douglas drew heav-
ily on the appellant’s brief and the amicus brief of the ACLU.
Utilizing a long and diverse line of precedent, he found that out
of several of the enumerated constitutional rights there were ar-
eas that, while unstated, created protective zones in which the
state could not unduly intrude.148  According to Justice Douglas,
emanating from the rights expressly guaranteed by the Constitu-
tion are penumbras of protected areas that ensured “a harmony
in living.”149
As Justice Douglas noted, the First Amendment contains sev-
eral “peripheral” rights that are not mentioned in the text of the
document, but have been established by the Court over time.150
These rights include:  the right to be free from a state’s efforts to
“contract the spectrum of available knowledge”;151 a guarantee
of the right to distribute, receive, and read publications;152 the
freedom to teach, inquire, and think;153 and the freedom of asso-
ciation.154  Without these and other peripheral, unenumerated
rights, the rights expressly guaranteed by the Constitution would
be less secure and potentially inconsequential.155  Thus, while a
guarantee like the freedom of association “is not expressly in-
A Response to his Critics , in  “HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN”:  THE LEG-
ACY OF WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS 155, 157 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990).  She hypothe-
sizes that Justice Douglas was conscious of the distinction and made it in order to
“distinguish his concept of a constitutional right of privacy from the tort right to
privacy.” Id.
146 Brief for Appellee at 13-14, Griswold , 381 U.S. 479 (No. 496), 1965 WL
115613.
147 Id.  at 28.
148 See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 482-86.
149 Id.  at 486.
150 See id.  at 482-83.
151 Id.  at 482 (citing Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)).
152 Id.  (citing Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943)).
153 Id.  (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952)).
154 Id.  at 483 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)).
155 Id.  at 482-83.
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cluded in the First Amendment[,] its existence is necessary in
making the express guarantees fully meaningful.”156
Similarly, the Third Amendment acts to reinforce the notion
that there is a zone of privacy free from governmental intrusions
by prohibiting the quartering of soldiers in the homes of citizens
in times of peace without the owner’s consent.157  The Fourth and
Fifth Amendments protect against government’s intrusion “of
the sanctity of a man’s home and the privacies of life.”158  The
Ninth Amendment provides that none of the enumerated rights
“shall . . . be construed to deny or disparage others retained by
the people,” thereby ensuring that citizens’ privacy rights are not
limited to the express provisions of the Constitution, but rather
also emanate from the unstated penumbral rights of the
document.159
Thus, by providing multiple analogues to case law and painting
a vivid picture of the Constitution expanding outside of its ex-
press mores to include territory that is deemed implicit by its
very necessity, Justice Douglas created the authority for the no-
tion that a privacy right exists.  His tone of voice is authoritative,
and mildly conciliatory, as he turns down the invitation by appel-
lants to implicate the Due Process Clause, conceding early on
that the Court does “not sit as a super-legislature to determine
the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws that touch economic
problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”160  While Justice
Douglas resisted the temptation to return to the early twentieth-
century jurisprudence of Lochner v. New York161  where the Su-
preme Court found that the right to contract was guaranteed
within the “liberty” prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
he did not hesitate in finding the sacred union of marriage to be a
fundamental right that predated the Bill of Rights.162  Appar-
ently drawing on his Protestant heritage, Justice Douglas read
the text of the Constitution as a sacred text, but presumably with
more of a concern for the spirit, as opposed to the letter, of the
156 Id.  at 483.
157 Id.  at 484.
158 Id.  (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)).
159 Id.  (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX).
160 Id.  at 482.
161 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
162 Griswold , 381 U.S. at 486 (stating that the Court was dealing with a “right of
privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties, older than our
school system”).
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document.163  Thus, Justice Douglas, through analogy to the
shadowy rights that emanate from the express guarantees of the
Constitution, and an appeal to the ancient natural law of the
sanctity of marriage, created the right of privacy.
Justice Douglas’s opinion embodies much of what Professor
White maintains is the creative potential of the legal writer.  Jus-
tice Douglas expanded the narrow specifics of the legal conversa-
tion to include areas only hinted at by appellants.164  He
embraced his power to reconstitute the legal language, and in so
doing, transformed American culture.  He utilized the tools at his
disposal (the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments)
to create an entirely new way of viewing the objectively deline-
ated proscriptions of the Constitution, thereby making it far
more subjective.  Thus, Justice Douglas’s opinion is evidence of
both the transformative power of the language in law and the
law’s revolutionary potential relative to our culture.
Justice Douglas, therefore, embodies the spirit of the strong
textualist.  He created the meaning necessary from the Constitu-
tion to achieve his desired political vision.  He read the Constitu-
tion and precedent and created  the meaning rather than
discovering it.  This is not to suggest that his opinion is illegiti-
mate in any way, but merely to point out that, in this particular
instance, it was Douglas’s far-reaching interpretation of the Con-
stitution that dictated the direction of the Court.
2. Justice Goldberg
Justice Goldberg agreed with Justice Douglas and rested his
belief that “the concept of liberty . . . embraces the right of mari-
tal privacy though that right is not mentioned explicitly in the
Constitution” on both the precedent provided by Justice Douglas
and the language and history of the Ninth Amendment.165
Gleaning his authority from the text of the Constitution, namely
the Ninth Amendment, and the thoughts of the Framers, he ar-
163 WHITE, supra  note 42, at 172; see also WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, GO EAST, R
YOUNG MAN:  THE EARLY YEARS 6 (1974) (noting that his father was an ordained
minister).  Professor White refers in passing to Justice Douglas’s Protestant upbring-
ing and its possible influence on his opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut . WHITE,
supra  note 42, at 172.  He specifically suggests that Douglas “like all Protestants” R
focused on “the sacred text rather than the tradition,” but he was one “who read the
text with an eye not to its letter but to its spirit.” Id.
164 See Brief for Appellants, supra  note 140. R
165 Griswold , 381 U.S. at 486-87 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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gued that “fundamental rights exist that are not expressly enu-
merated in the first eight amendments.”166  The Ninth
Amendment makes it clear that there was “an intent that the list
of rights included there [are] not [to] be deemed exhaustive.”167
However, just as Justice Douglas was authoritative in his asser-
tion that penumbral rights created the right of privacy, Justice
Goldberg was defensive in maintaining the historical relevance of
the Ninth Amendment.
Justice Goldberg was quick to point out that he is not arguing
for a decree that judges can decide carte blanche which rights are
fundamental, and thus guaranteed under the Ninth Amend-
ment.168  Rather, he based his notion of fundamental rights on
the “traditions and [collective] conscience of our people.”169  In
other words, a determination must be made as to whether the
right in question is one which “lie[s] at the base of all our civil
and political institutions.”170  Thus, Justice Goldberg relied on a
rather nebulous and poorly defined assortment of concepts—tra-
ditions, civil and political institutions, and the collective con-
science of the people—to define the guarantees of the Ninth
Amendment.  While the authority is certainly legitimate—in that
the precedent was good law—Justice Goldberg presaged future
controversy by couching his language in defensive, qualifier-
laden sentences that are frequently written in reply to positions
put forth by the dissenters.171
Furthermore, Justice Goldberg, like Justice Rehnquist in Paul
v. Davis ,172 relied on the age-old tactic of hyperbolic analogue to
drive his point home.  He utilized the “slippery slope” tactic to
argue that if the logic of the dissenters is employed and allowed
166 Id.  at 492.
167 Id.
168 Id.  at 493.
169 Id. (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
170 Id.  (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932)).
171 See, e.g. , id.  at 490-91 (“While this Court has had little occasion to interpret
the Ninth Amendment . . . [i]n interpreting the Constitution ‘real effect should be
given to all the words it uses.’” (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 151
(1926))); id.  at 492 (“A dissenting opinion suggests that my interpretation of the
Ninth Amendment somehow ‘broaden[s] the powers of this Court.’” (quoting id.  at
520 (Black, J., dissenting))) ; id.  at 493 (“Nor am I turning somersaults with history
in arguing that the Ninth Amendment is relevant in a case dealing with a State’s
infringement of a fundamental right.”); id.  at 498-99 (“Finally, it should be said of
the Court’s holding today that it in no way interferes with a State’s proper regulation
of sexual promiscuity or misconduct.”).
172 See supra  text accompanying notes 87-103. R
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-3\ORE305.txt unknown Seq: 33  9-APR-07 14:35
2006] Black and White 885
to take its natural course, then a state’s implementation of a stat-
ute limiting family size through sterilization would be constitu-
tional.173  This oft-employed tactic effectively expresses the
gravity of the situation and makes a counterruling by any of the
Justices very difficult, for it invokes frightening images of com-
munist-implemented social structuring.
3. Justice Harlan
Justice Harlan acknowledged the importance of “judicial self-
restraint” and paid lip service to the dissenting Justices’ concerns
with the unchecked judicial freedom granted in the majority
opinion.174  However, he was quick to point out that the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment “stands . . . on its
own bottom.”175  That is to say, Justice Harlan thought the Con-
necticut statutes should have been overturned because they vio-
lated basic values contained within the “concept of ordered
liberty” protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.176
Therefore, Justice Harlan shifted the parameters within which
the judicial conversation took place.  Authority for overturning
the Connecticut statutes should not be linked to some amor-
phous rights that emanate from the prescribed guarantees of the
Constitution, but rather from the Fourteenth Amendment itself.
There is no need for the Court to search for answers in the
shadows of the explicit rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights; the
Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty is enough to pre-
vent the state from intruding into the marital bedroom.
4. Justice White
Justice White relied on the judicially established doctrine of
strict scrutiny to find the Connecticut statute unconstitutional.177
He utilized precedent to first determine that marriage falls under
the broad evocation of “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment
and cannot be deprived without “due process.”178  Next, he rea-
soned that because the Connecticut anticontraceptive statute
173 See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 496-97 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
174 See id.  at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
175 Id. at 500.
176 Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
177 Id. at 507 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
178 Id.  at 502.  Justice White cites Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923),
Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925), and Skinner v. Oklahoma ,
316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942), to show that “there is a ‘realm of family life which the state
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substantially dealt with the marriage relationship, it was required
to withstand the rigors of strict scrutiny to survive.179  To justify
the infringement, the law would have to be narrowly tailored to
the goals of the statute.180  Finally, Justice White addressed the
reasons given by Connecticut in support of the statute’s enact-
ment, namely to curtail “promiscuous or illicit sexual relation-
ships,” and found no nexus between the stated goal of the statute
and the way it was effectuated.181  Thus, Justice White, utilizing
previously enunciated judicial rules and processes, found that the
Connecticut statute did not meet the Court’s strict scrutiny stan-
dard, for it was not narrowly tailored to meet the goals
expressed.182
It appears on its face that Justice White crafted an opinion that
should withstand the withering attacks of those who condemn ju-
dicial activism, while still maintaining a liberal view of personal
sexual autonomy.  Nevertheless, he took great pains to empha-
size that the state could regulate sexual relationships.183  His
opinion seems deliberately crafted in such a way as to not touch
on the substantive rights at issue.  Furthermore, he belabored the
due process element of Fourteenth Amendment analysis, while
steering clear of Justice Douglas’s broad penumbral view.  In
fact, it appears that had Connecticut more effectively rational-
ized the restriction on access to contraceptives by stating that
contraceptives were “immoral” or the ban was necessary to pro-
mote “population expansion,” Justice White would have deter-
mined that the statute fell within the state’s legitimate police
powers, and would have found no reason to deem the statute
unconstitutional.184
Thus, Justice White redefined the parameters of the judicial
conversation in a manner that allowed him to overturn the stat-
cannot enter’ without substantial justification.” Id.  (quoting Prince v. Massachu-
setts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
179 Id.  at 503-04.
180 See id.  at 504.
181 Id.  at 505 (“I wholly fail to see how the ban on the use of contraceptives by
married couples in any way reinforces the State’s ban on illicit sexual
relationships.”).
182 See id.  at 507 (“I find nothing in this record justifying the sweeping scope of
this statute, with its telling effect on the freedoms of married persons, and therefore
conclude that it deprives such persons of liberty without due process of law.”).
183 See id.  at 505 (referring to the statute’s goal of regulating promiscuous or illicit
sexual relationships as “concededly a permissible and legitimate legislative goal”).
184 See id. at 505-06.
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ute without requiring him to sift through the Bill of Right’s shad-
owy penumbral guarantees.  However, in so doing, Justice White
had to rely on disingenuous and somewhat specious reasoning
regarding Connecticut’s anticontraceptive statute and its tailor-
ing.  While the regulation of morals is well within the state’s po-
lice powers,185 Justice White was quick to emphasize that the
statute restricted the use of contraceptives to married couples ,
and in so doing, unduly restricted their liberty to engage in family
planning.186  His articulated rationale was that the proscription
was not narrowly tailored; however, he failed to address similar
proscriptions that did not warrant examination by the Supreme
Court in New York and Massachusetts.187  Justice White equated
the anticontraception statute with an anti-birth control statute
and dismissed the state’s proffered rationale of limiting extra-
marital affairs,188 completely ignoring the state’s argument that
married couples have alternative avenues of family planning.189
Moreover, Justice White never mentioned the state’s expert testi-
mony regarding the potential health problems associated with us-
ing the contraceptives provided at the clinic.190  Finally, Justice
White noted that population control would be a legitimate mo-
tive for the state to assert,191 completely disregarding that the
state addressed the issue in its brief.192
Therefore, it appears, after a cursory reading at least, that Jus-
tice White was warranted in overturning the statute.  His posited
185 See id.  at 505.
186 Id.  at 505-06.
187 See id.  The state offered examples from New York and Massachusetts where
the Supreme Court had refused to take cases involving legislation that prohibited
the dissemination of contraceptives.  Brief for Appellee, supra  note 146, at 15. R
188 See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 503, 506 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
Connecticut had several statutes in place, such as proscriptions on adultery and for-
nication, that sought to impede “extramarital indulgence, as to which risk of illegiti-
mate pregnancy is a recognized deterrent.”  Brief for Appellee, supra  note 146, at 15 R
(quoting State v. Nelson, 11 A.2d 856, 861 (Conn. 1940)).
189 See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).  The
state offered studies to show that couples could engage in “[a]bstinence, withdrawal
and the rhythm method” as effective alternatives to the contraceptives offered at the
clinic.  Brief for Appellee, supra  note 146, at 16. R
190 The state introduced doctors’ testimony that the use of contraceptives was det-
rimental to users’ health.  Brief for Appellee, supra note 146, at 21-22.
191 Griswold , 381 U.S. at 505 (White, J., concurring in the judgment) (“There is no
serious contention that Connecticut thinks . . . the anti-use statute is founded upon
any policy of promoting population expansion.”).
192 See  Brief for Appellee, supra  note 146, at 28.  The state’s brief cites an Associ- R
ated Press release that indicates that the populations of both the nation and Con-
necticut were decreasing. Id.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\85-3\ORE305.txt unknown Seq: 36  9-APR-07 14:35
888 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85, 853
rationale—there were more efficient ways for Connecticut to
look after the morality and health of its population—seems justi-
fied.  However, in requiring the state’s rationale to be articulated
with the utmost specificity, Justice White disingenuously engaged
the issue.  It is clear that Connecticut expressed, in at least some
form, each of the valid reasons that Justice White gave for an
anticontraceptive statute.  The fact that the reasons were post
hoc and not given upon the drafting of the legislation did not
seem to bother Justice White.  In fact, had Justice White obtained
a majority of the votes, Connecticut probably could have re-
drafted the statute to include a clear articulation of its legitimate
purposes and met the narrowly tailored element of the constitu-
tional standard.
Therefore, it is clear Justice White had reservations about the
constitutionality of the statute, but was unwilling to limit it on
substantive grounds.  His attack was limited to the procedural
mechanisms in place that, while effective in limiting Connecti-
cut’s particular legislation, had little or no effect on future state
attempts to regulate personal sexual autonomy.
Unwilling to take the potentially revolutionary stance of Jus-
tice Douglas, nor able to sanction a statute that clearly pervaded
a citizen’s liberty (whether or not that liberty is expressly articu-
lated in the Constitution), Justice White’s opinion straddles the
two extremes and is firmly planted in the status-quo-preserving
middle ground.  It is here, within the realm of concession and
compromise, that Professor White claims the language of the dis-
pute is shaped and a common understanding of the dispute be-
comes intelligible.193  However, while an opinion such as Justice
White’s can clearly lead to the resolution of the specific, narrow
conflict presently being addressed, it is wholly inadequate for for-
mulating solutions to the broader and more contentious general
debate.  Nowhere does Justice White offer a standard with which
to assess those rights not expressly articulated in the Constitu-
tion.  Nor does Justice White enunciate a theory of judicial inter-
pretation that could potentially lead to the resolution of future
conflicts.
Justice White utilized the tools of the “considerate communi-
cator” in crafting his concurrence.194  He subtly misstated and
slightly manipulated several of the facts (e.g., the state’s reasons
193 See WHITE, supra  note 2, at 268.
194 See supra Part II.B.
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for drafting the statute) in order to advance his primary motive—
the overturning of the statute.  Justice White was likely moti-
vated by the fact that he, like Justice Stewart, may have felt the
statute was “unwise, or even asinine.”195  Perhaps Justice White
deemed the statute morally or ethically offensive,196 but was con-
strained by the procedural mechanisms of the Court, and was
therefore forced to employ the considerate communicator tech-
niques for the greater good.  Ultimately, however, Justice
White’s opinion can be valued for providing a procedural and
uncontroversial solution to a difficult problem, but it wholly lacks
what Professor White values—the power to reconstitute our lan-
guage, culture, and community.
C. Dissenting Opinions
In their dissents, Justices Black and Stewart maintained that
the power to reconstitute our language, culture, and community
is a power wholly reserved for the legislature, and to hold other-
wise is to promote anti- or undemocratic principles.  They scath-
ingly chastised Justice Douglas for straying into the realm of the
undemocratic with his searching penumbral inquiry.197
In his dissent, Justice Black confronted Justice Douglas’s
strong textualist approach, and criticized the Court’s reliance on
the vagaries of natural law and judicial lawmaking.198  He took
issue with the majority’s substitution of constitutional doctrine
195 See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
196 Even Justice Black in the dissent concedes that there are “evil qualities” to the
law and that it “is every bit as offensive to me as it is to my Brethren of the major-
ity.” See id.  at 507 (Black, J., dissenting).
197 Even though Justices Black and Stewart wrote separate dissents, I combine
both dissents in my analysis because each Justice joined the other’s dissent, Justice
Black clearly articulates the feelings of both, and Justice Stewart’s individual dissent
lends little new material to the discussion.
198 Id.  at 520-21 (Black, J., dissenting) (“My point is that there is no provision of
the Constitution which either expressly or impliedly vests power in this Court to sit
as a supervisory agency over acts of duly constituted legislative bodies and set aside
their laws because of the Court’s belief that the legislative policies adopted are un-
reasonable, unwise, arbitrary, capricious or irrational.  The adoption of such a loose,
flexible, uncontrolled standard for holding laws unconstitutional, if ever it is finally
achieved, will amount to a great unconstitutional shift of power to the courts which I
believe and am constrained to say will be bad for the courts and worse for the coun-
try.  Subjecting federal and state laws to such an unrestrained and unrestrainable
judicial control as to the wisdom of legislative enactments would, I fear, jeopardize
the separation of governmental powers that the Framers set up and at the same time
threaten to take away much of the power of States to govern themselves which the
Constitution plainly intended them to have.”).
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for personal preference.199  According to Black, nowhere in the
Constitution is the judiciary given the right to exercise a “super-
visory veto over the wisdom and value of legislative policies and
to hold unconstitutional those laws which they believe unwise or
dangerous.”200  The power to veto laws, he noted, is the power to
make laws, and as such, was specifically denied the courts by the
Convention that framed the Constitution.201  Furthermore, the
precedent the majority relied on in formulating their “natural
law due process philosophy” was in many cases later
“repudiated.”202
Thus, Justice Black plainly saw the issue as the unwarranted
conferment of legislative duties to the judiciary, rather than the
proscription of rights of individuals by the state.  Unless re-
strained by an express prohibition in the Constitution, “a state
legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do.”203  To substitute
democratically elected legislators with unelected, life-tenured
judges would be to submit “to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic
Guardians.”204  While Justice Black clearly took issue with the
majority’s reliance on “natural law,” he conceded that “interpre-
tation” of the Constitution is a requisite element of the Court’s
duty.205  Once involved in interpretation, the result of the Court’s
inquiry may be a “contraction or extension of the original pur-
199 Id.  at 511-12 (“If these formulas based on ‘natural justice,’ or others which
mean the same thing, are to prevail, they require judges to determine what is or is
not constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or
unnecessary.  The power to make such decisions is of course that of a legislative
body.”).
200 Id.  at 512.
201 Quoting several of the Framers of the Constitution for support, Justice Black
notes that “the Constitutional Convention did on at least two occasions reject pro-
posals which would have given the federal judiciary a part in recommending laws or
in vetoing as bad or unwise the legislation passed by the Congress.” Id. at 513-14
n.6.
202 Justice Black specifically refers to Pierce v. Society of Sisters , 268 U.S. 510
(1925), and Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Id.  at 516.
203 Id.  at 523 n.19 (quoting Tyson & Brother—United Theatre Ticket Offices, Inc.
v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 446 (1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting)).
204 Id.  at 526 (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  THE OLIVER
WENDELL HOLMES LECTURES, 1958, at 73 (1958)).
205 See id.  at 525 (“Since Marbury v. Madison  . . . was decided, the practice has
been firmly established, for better or worse, that courts can strike down legislative
enactments which violate the Constitution.  This process, of course, involves inter-
pretation, and since words can have many meanings, interpretation obviously may
result in contraction or extension of the original purpose of a constitutional provi-
sion, thereby affecting policy.”) (quoting Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 90-91
(1947) (Black, J., dissenting)).
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pose of a constitutional provision, thereby affecting policy.”206
However, the Court was never granted the carte blanche right to
apply undefined concepts such as “natural law.”  Rather, it must
proceed “within clearly marked constitutional boundaries [and]
seek to execute policies written into the Constitution.”207
Therefore, in dissenting, Justice Black countered the strong
textualist approach by Justice Douglas with his own form of weak
textualism.  The Constitution was written with particular and
very specific roles for the judiciary and legislature.  Above all
else, those roles must be maintained.  The interaction of the dif-
ferent “conceptual structures”208 operates to reveal the true
meaning of the Constitution.  The Constitution works not to pro-
vide the Court with a set of substantive rights from which to ex-
trapolate additional rights, but rather as a framework within
which the different branches must interact.  The interpretation of
the text of the Constitution by the Court, when necessary, is part
of its function.  However, the determination of substantive rights
treads on the duties limited to the legislature and thus violates
the very tenets upon which the Constitution was established.
CONCLUSION
Justice Black’s dissent in Griswold succinctly poses the ques-
tion facing our society, occupying our judicial scholars, and fre-
quently being advanced before our courts:  Are we to change the
Constitution from time to time, or is it a static document?209  Are
we to rely solely on the prescribed procedural remedy of consti-
tutional amendments, or is the Court qualified to extrapolate
substantive rights from those expressly articulated?
Many of Justice Douglas’s most vociferous critics argue that
206 Id.  (quoting Adamson , 332 U.S. at 90-91).
207 Id.  (quoting Adamson , 332 U.S. at 91-92).
208 See supra Part II.C.
209 See Griswold , 381 U.S. at 522 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I realize that many good
and able men have eloquently spoken and written, sometimes in rhapsodical strains,
about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution in tune with the times.  The
idea is that the Constitution must be changed from time to time and that this Court
is charged with a duty to make those changes.  For myself, I must with all deference
reject that philosophy.  The Constitution makers knew the need for change and pro-
vided for it.  Amendments suggested by the people’s elected representatives can be
submitted to the people or their selected agents for ratification.  That method of
change was good for our Fathers, and being somewhat old-fashioned I must add it is
good enough for me.  And so, I cannot rely on the Due Process Clause or the Ninth
Amendment or any mysterious and uncertain natural law concept as a reason for
striking down this state law.”).
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his opinion represents a clear-cut case of undemocratic judicial
activism.210  To expand the meaning of the Constitution past its
written context is to pervert the structure of the American sys-
tem created at the Founding so that judges, not legislatures, are
making the law.211  Judges can rely only on the clearly prescribed
written authority; to do otherwise is to invite judicial despotism.
However, when viewed through the eyes of Law and Litera-
ture scholars, it becomes clear that Justice Douglas should be
lauded for his creativity.  The law is an imperfect expression of
the popular will.  Judges are not changing the Constitution they
inherited from 1787; rather, they are articulating what has be-
come a very different Constitution.
Constitutional scholar Bruce Ackerman argues that since the
Founding, the Court has played a part in fine-tuning what were
momentous changes in American history.212  The Court has been
involved in a synthesizing process, connecting past political
events such as the Founding, Reconstruction Amendments, or
New Deal era changes, with what “the People” want for the fu-
ture.213  Popular upheaval has led the reshaping of the Constitu-
tion at every instance.  First, the Founding after the American
Revolution reshaped the Articles of Confederation.  Next, the
Constitution was amended after the Civil War to provide others
with the rights previously reserved for whites only.  Finally,
through the actions of a popularly elected president and a major-
ity in Congress, the Democrats created the New Deal, where the
state’s economic paternalism subsumed the individual’s uninhib-
ited right to contract.  In each instance the Court was charged,
after momentous popular movements, to structure a new adjudi-
cative regime—one that added conservative stability to the mix
by looking back to past judicial rulings while moving forward to
where the will of the people pushed for change.  In doing so, the
Court has kept America connected to the Founders’ ideals while
actualizing the will of the people.  Therefore, despite criticism to
210 See JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPENDENT JOURNEY:  THE LIFE OF WILLIAM O.
DOUGLAS 348-49 (1980); Glancy, supra note 145, at 160-62; see also Gerard, supra R
note 6; Loewy, supra  note 6; Van Alstyne, supra  note 6. R
211 For an interesting argument concerning claims of judicial activism, see Sanford
Levinson, Poison Pen , NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 9, 2006, at 12.  Professor Levinson ar-
gues that critics, in pointing out the antidemocratic nature of judicial review, have
failed to acknowledge the very antidemocratic nature of the presidential veto. Id.
212 See 1 ACKERMAN, supra  note 66, at 40-41. R
213 See id.
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the contrary, the Court’s incremental changes in granting sub-
stantive rights are not undemocratic.  Rather, they are examples
of the democratic process perfecting itself.
Justice Douglas was not the first Supreme Court Justice to
make use of the penumbra metaphor.214  Prior to Griswold , the
metaphor had a rich history in which Justices Holmes, Cardozo,
and Frankfurter used it to aid judicial interpretation.215  Addi-
tionally, the legal theorist H.L.A. Hart, in his 1958 article “Posi-
tivism and the Separation of Law and Morals,” characterized the
issues arising outside of the settled meaning of the law as
“problems of the penumbra.”216  While Hart’s characterization of
the penumbra is related more to the specific meaning of a settled
denotation of a word within a legal document, it is characteristic
of the understood meaning of the term in legal scholarship prior
to Griswold .217  According to Hart, outside of a legal term’s set-
tled meaning is a penumbra within which the judge or justice is
free to shape “what the law ought to be.”218  Therefore, Professor
Hart, like Professor White and Justice Douglas, saw the affirma-
tive potential of the judiciary and sought to explain how, in inter-
preting various legal uncertainties within the law, the judiciary
should keep in mind that “the existing law imposes only limits on
our choice and not the choice itself.”219
Even as he dissented in Griswold , Justice Black was willing to
214 Burr Henly, “Penumbra”:  The Roots of a Legal Metaphor , 15 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 81, 83 (1987) (“Commentators sometimes discuss Douglas’ Griswold
penumbra as if the metaphor had never before appeared in American jurispru-
dence. . . . In fact, the penumbra metaphor had a long and distinguished history prior
to Griswold , beginning with Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes.”); see also  Glancy,
supra note 145, at 162. R
215 See Henly, supra note 214, at 83-89.
216 H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals , 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593, 607 (1958). Hart famously explained the “problems of the penumbra”
utilizing the legal rule regarding a “vehicle.” Id.  While a rule that forbids you to
take a vehicle into the public park clearly forbids an automobile, does it also include
bicycles, airplanes, or roller skates?  “There must be a core of settled meaning, but
there will be, as well, a penumbra of debatable cases in which words are neither
obviously applicable nor obviously ruled out.” Id.
217 See  Henly, supra  note 214, at 91. R
218 Hart, supra  note 216, at 608. R
219 Id.  at 629; see also  Glancy, supra note 145, at 162 (“For Douglas, the Constitu- R
tion was not a source of shadows, but rather of a grand aurora borealis, of which the
right of privacy was a part.  In contrast to Holmes’s use of penumbra as half shadow,
Douglas emphasized it as half light.  To the extent that we too can see the outlines of
an implied right of privacy, Douglas’s penumbral right of privacy has affected the
way we see the world, and the Constitution.”).
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concede that within the understood meaning of the law, gray ar-
eas require judicial interpretation for further clarification.220  Jus-
tice Douglas utilized a form of interpretation that took into
account the changing mores of the populace and saw within the
gray areas of the law room to move it forward.  Ultimately, Jus-
tice Douglas preserved the abstract ideals of the Founding by ex-
trapolating from the sum total of the Bill of Rights the rather
nebulous right of privacy.221  This creative undertaking exempli-
fies the Law and Literature ideal and fits squarely within the
models posited by Professors Ackerman and Hart.  But more im-
portantly, Justice Douglas formulated an articulate method for
an expansion of substantive rights and the concomitant cultural
change.  He personified Professor White’s ideal by using the law
to modify our culture in response to the demands of modern
circumstances.
220 See supra  notes 205-06 and accompanying text. R
221 See  1 ACKERMAN, supra  note 66, at 155-56. R
